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Grenfell Report: New construction czar to tackle ‘decades of failure’

editor

Seven years on from one of the worst tragedies in British history, in which 72 people perished in a terrifying high-rise fire, the findings of a public inquiry into what happened have been published today, with harsh lessons for the construction industry and proposed changes for the way it approaches higher-risk building projects in the future.  

Credit: theblowup via Unsplash.

The Grenfell disaster 

The Grenfell Tower disaster brought under close scrutiny the failings of the state and the construction industry with regards to the safety of building materials, in this case used to clad a 24-storey residential tower in North Kensington, West London, which was engulfed in fire on 14 June, 2017, claiming the lives of 72 people, with dozens more injured. It was one of the deadliest structural fires in British history, burning for around 60 hours. 

The origin of the blaze was an electrical fault in a large fridge-freezer in a flat kitchen, which spread quickly and uncontrollably throughout the tower block owing to combustible insulation, cladding and filler used throughout the existing concrete structure as well as poor installation techniques. The final report, published six years after the inquiry began, examines how Grenfell came to be in a condition which allowed the fire to spread so rapidly, including the role of local and central government, the London Fire Brigade (LFB), materials manufacturers and the building industry.  

It follows an initial report, published in October 2019, which determined the cladding used “failed to comply” with building regulations and was the ‘principal’ reason for the pace at which the fire spread. Since the disaster, legal enforcements have been introduced to make building owners fix serious fire safety issues including building remediation orders under the Building Safety Act 2022. Surveys undertaken since the blaze found external wall materials like those used on Grenfell have been used on hundreds of other high-rise residential buildings around the country, with remediation work since completed on less than a third. 

New construction regulator 

The report calls for the establishment of a “construction regulator”, headed by a single independent body, reporting to a single Secretary of State, to drive “much-needed change in the culture of the construction industry” and promote and oversee the following areas: 

  • Licensing of contractors on higher-risk builds (min 18 metres) 
  • Monitoring the operation of Building Regulations 
  • Regulation and oversight of building control 
  • Product regulation and compliance 
  • Fire safety research and testing 
  • Accrediting fire risk assessors 
  • Knowledge sharing 

It has also recommended the appointment of a Chief Construction Adviser to the lone Secretary of State on “all matters affecting the construction industry” – and that the definition of a higher-risk building for the purposes of the Building Safety Act be “urgently” reviewed. 

“We are aware that in the period since the Grenfell Tower fire Parliament has passed the Building Safety Act 2022 to regulate work on higher-risk buildings, to impose particular duties on those involved in the construction and refurbishment of such buildings and to establish a Building Safety Regulator responsible for building control and for overseeing standards of competence,” the report states.  

“However, responsibility for the range of functions identified above remains dispersed. We therefore recommend that the government draw together under a single regulator all the functions relating to the construction industry to which we have referred.” 

The recommendations come after serious failings were found on the part of local and central authorities, building materials manufacturers and construction contractors to prevent a tragedy like Grenfell from happening and by blue light services in their training and response to the blaze and tenant evacuation.  

Due to the ‘scale and complexity’ of the investigation, individuals are unlikely to be charged or tried until at least 10 years after the incident, the Metropolitan Police and Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) previously said – potentially meaning late 2026 at the earliest before any criminal prosecutions begin. However, the report has recommended a comprehensive review of fire safety by the state, emergency services and the built environment following ‘decades of failure’. 

Key findings of the Phase Two report 

  • Cladding was ‘by far the largest contributor’ to the fire 
  • Grenfell was the result of ‘decades of failure’ by central government and the construction industry 
  • System of regulating construction and refurbishment of high-rises was “seriously defective” 
  • Fire safety testing by Building Research Establishment (BRE) marred by “inadequate practices” and “lack of effective oversight” 
  • “Systematic dishonesty” by cladding and insulation manufacturers; BRE also complicit 
  • Arconic Architectural Products “deliberately concealed” danger of Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form 
  • Foam insulation manufacturer Celotex embarked on a ‘dishonest scheme to mislead customers and the market’ 
  • Kingspan “knowingly created a false market” in insulation for use on buildings over 18 metres in height 
  • Studio E, Rydon and Harley ‘failed to identify own responsibilities for design’ and ‘assumed someone else was responsible for fire safety’ 
  • Exova bears “considerable responsibility” for the ‘dangerous condition of Grenfell after its refurbishment’ 
  • Failure by building product certification bodies on quality, testing and compliance 
  • Council and Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) showed ‘persistent indifference to fire safety, particularly of vulnerable people’ 
  • “Chronic and systemic failings” in the TMO’s management of fire safety 
  • Govt agenda ‘ignored, delayed or disregarded’ the safety of life in key learnings  
  • London Fire Brigade lacked ‘strategy and training’ 

Legal comment 

Andrew Parker, head of the Construction Disputes and Building Safety practices at law firm Forsters, said: “A key finding is that government was given plenty of warning as far back as 1991 of the risks of combustible cladding panels and insulation, particularly on higher-rise buildings, and so had opportunities to take action but failed to do so. 

“The arrangements for procuring works to higher-risk buildings have been found to be deficient.   

“There is a clear message that the way key members of the construction industry have been regulated and trained needs to change and guidance provided by government for compliance with the relevant legislation needs to be improved.  

“Regulation of the construction industry has become too complex and fragmented. 

“There will be tighter regulation of fire engineers and contractors which, depending on the timescale for implementation, may squeeze an already resource-starved area of the industry.”  

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If you have a tip or story idea that fits with our publication, please contact the news editor rory@wavenews.co.uk 

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